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ABSTRACT
T he m ark et for heroin  is m odelled a s  
a  sim ple C o u rn o t gam e b etw een  two  
p lay ers , on e of w hom  is d o m in an t, 
a n d  w h ere  in fo rm atio n  co n ce rn in g  
police activ ities  is a sy m m e tric . It is  
sh ow n  th a t  u n d e r th e s e  co n d itio n s  
th e d o m in an t player h a s  a  u n ilateral 
in c e n tiv e  to  e n c o u ra g e  in c r e a s e d  
h a r a s s m e n t  of th e  o th e r  p la y e r . 
W ith in  th is  fram ew ork , a  policy  of 
in cre a se d  seller h a ra ss m e n t re d u ce s  
h e ro in  co n su m p tio n  in th e  c u rre n t  
period. However, if th e policy is only  
tem p orary , th en  th e lon g-term  re su lts  
co u ld  in c lu d e  a n  in c re a s e  in  th e  
c o n s u m p t io n  o f h e r o in  if th e  
d o m in a n t  p la y e r  e m p lo y s  i t s  
e n h a n ce d  ca p a c ity  for fu tu re  h eroin  
m a r k e tin g  a n d  p o lic e -c o r r u p tin g  
activities.
1. Introduction
The current New South Wales state election campaign has once 
again highlighted the apparent abhorrence with which, according 
to the politicians, the public at large views commercial traffickers 
of 'hard' drugs such as heroin. The opposition leader has pledged 
that his p arty , if elected to governm ent, will define such  
trafficking activities, along with other crimes such as murder, as 
'horrific' crimes, punishable by up to life imprisonment. This 
current pre-occupation with heroin-seller harassment is simply a 
continuation of the predom inant emphasis which Australian  
heroin-control policy has had since heroin was first declared a 
prohibited substance in Australia in the 1950s. Not surprisingly, 
Australian law-enforcement officials have not been the only ones 
to target heroin suppliers more intensely than consumers. It seems 
that at least the United States and Britain have followed similar 
enforcement policies (for a more detailed discussion of the history 
of Australian, United States and British heroin law enforcement 
policy see Neri 1990, chapter 1).
A ccording to Becker (1968), the gains from collusion in an 
illicit industry such as that for heroin are, ceteris paribus, greater 
the smaller the costs of enforcing the collusive agreement (p. 206). 
Applying Becker's model to the heroin industry, Eatherly (1974, 
p. 213) argues that enforcement policies directed against sellers 
furnish colluding sellers with a cheap means of enforcing collusion 
and of preventing entry into the industry.
O n e w a y  to v iew  p o lice  p o licies of h a ra ss in g  se llers  is as 
e s ta b lish in g  a n o n p e cu n ia ry  'l ice n ce  fee '. T h o se  w h o are  
relatively  efficient in con verting  arrest and oth er h arassm en t into  
p ecu n iary  term s w ill 'p ay  the fee' an d  sell; o thers w ill be b arred  
fro m  th e tra d e . The sellers who succeed have an interest in 
enforcement o f the law to prevent entry by others (p . 2 1 3 , italics  
m ine).
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The objective of this paper is to present a simple model of a 
heroin industry in which increased seller harassment results in 
increased profits for the dominant firm or cartel. The market is 
modelled as a Cournot duopoly with one player being dominant 
in the sense of having the greater m arket share and inside 
inform ation on future enforcem ent activities. W ith such  
asym m etries, the dominant player has a unilateral incentive to 
encourage increased harassment of the other entrant.
Within this framework, a policy of increased seller harassment 
reduces heroin consum ption in the current period and, if 
permanent in the sense of Becker (1988), could also do so in the 
long run. However, if the policy is only temporary then the long­
term  results could include an increase in the consum ption of 
heroin if the dominant player employs its enhanced capacity for 
future heroin marketing and police-corrupting activities.
2 . The M odel
Suppose that a heroin market is supplied by two players who 
behave as Cournot duopolists. That is, each forecasts the other's 
output and then selects its own profit-maximising level of output. 
For the sake of simplicity assume that neither player consumes 
heroin, each takes existing levels of law enforcement activity as 
given and that player 1 supplies x, whilst player 2 supplies y. 
Law-enforcement activities increase the risks associated with the 
supply of heroin and result in a per-unit harassment premium of 
hi for player 1 and h2 for player 2 over and above importation 
and distribution costs. Player 1 is assumed to be dominant with 
inside access to police information such that x>y and h2 >hi.
Player 1 aims to maximise its profits n  where:
rc(x,y,hi) = xp(x+y)-c(x)-hix (1)
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and c is the per unit variable cost of player 1 and p the per unit 
price of heroin. Fixed costs are ignored for the sake of simplicity. 
The first-order condition for profit maximisation is:
nx = xp'+p-cx-hi = 0 (2)
while the second-order condition is:
^xx = xp"+2p'~cxx<0 (3)
Derivatives are denoted by subscripts except for price whose 
derivative is denoted p'.
Player 2 also aims to maximise its profits n* where
rc*(x,y,h2) = yp(x+y)-c*(y)-h2y (4)
and c* is the per unit variable cost of firm 2. The first and second 
order conditions respectively are:
n *y  = yp'+p-c*y-h2 = 0 (5)
n* y y  -  y p '+ 2 p '- c !fy y  <  0  ( 6 )
The following conditions are also assumed to hold:
7tXy  = xp"+ p ' < 0 and 7t*yx = yp "+ p ' < 0 (7)
Ttxx nxy and K*yy < 7t*yX (8)
Conditions (7) state that own marginal profits fall with an 
increase in the output of the other player as market price falls. 
Conditions (8) state that own output effects on marginal profit 
dom inate cross output effects. These conditions im ply the
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following:
D = KxxK *y y  ~ K x y K * y x  > 0  (9)
Equations (2) and (5) are reaction functions for players 1 and 
2 respectively. Given an output level for player 2, player 1 will 
maximise profits by setting its output level according to equation 
(2). Similarly, given an output level for player 1, player 2 will 
maximise profits by setting its output level according to equation 
(5). The simultaneous solution to equations (2) and (5) is the 
Nash equilibrium.
W e are interested in the effects of increased seller harassment 
in the next period. It is likely that such a change would result in a 
higher harassment premium and thus a higher market price for 
heroin. Now suppose that player 1 can, via inside information, 
entirely shield itself from the increased harassment whilst player 
2 can not. Thus dhi = 0 whereas dh2 > 0.
Totally differentiating (2) and (5) we get the following:
7txx dx+rcXy dy+7txhi d h i = 0 (10)
Tl̂ yx dx + n^yy dy + 7tJfyh2 dh2 = 0 (11)
Since dhi = 0 and 7i;*yh2 = "1 we may rewrite these equations in 
matrix form and use Cramer's rule to solve yielding:
d x / d h 2  = -7tXy / D  > 0 (12)
d y / d h 2 = rcxx/ D  < 0 (13)
d p / d h 2 = p '(d x /d h 2  + d y / d h 2 ) > 0 (14)
That is, increased seller harassm ent with asym m etric effects
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results in an increase in the output of the dom inant player, a 
reduction in the output of the other player and an increase in the 
per unit market price of heroin. It follows that industry output 
falls as follows:
d x / d h 2  + d y / d h 2  = (7CXX - nxy ) / D  < 0 (15)
A lso of interest are the effects on player profits. These are 
determined as follows:
d n / dh2 = (xp'7i:xx)/D > 0 (16)
d n * / dh2  = -(yp'Jtxy)/D -y  < 0 (17)
In other words, the profits of the dominant player increase whilst 
those of the other player decrease. Industry profits in total 
decrease as follows:
d ; t /d h 2  + d7C*/dh2 = (xp'7iXx ■ yp,7Cxy )/D  - y < 0 (18)
In sum m ary then, a one-period increase in heroin-seller 
harassm ent which has asymmetric effects on the two suppliers 
increases the market price of heroin, reduces its consumption and 
industry profits as a whole. W hat is surprising, perhaps, is that 
within this overall result the dominant player enjoys increased 
profitability and thus has a unilateral incentive to encourage  
periodic police crackdowns on its rivals.
3. Concluding Comments
The model presented above is highly simplified. It is unlikely that 
a heroin market is inhabited by only two players and even more 
unlikely that increased seller-harassment effects accrue to one
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player only. Despite these and other limitations, the model seems 
to imply an often observed characteristic of such illicit markets, 
that is, the incentive which exists for police corruption. The 
increased profits accruing to the dominant player m ay allow it to 
undertake more effective future marketing strategies such as 
offering free samples to potential consum ers in discos etc. It 
seem s to be the case that such episodes of increased seller 
harassm ent tend to be transient in nature, perhaps reflecting 
political considerations at the time of an election.
This model also lends support to Eatherly's contention noted 
above. W ith increased profits comes the potential for increased 
corruption and official complicity in heroin-supplying activities. 
Under these conditions, participating enforcement officials have a 
significant incentive to maintain the status quo.
In d eed  [th e p o lice ] co u ld  sim u lta n e o u sly  se rv e  th eir so cia l  
m an d ate  of red u cin g  d ru g  con sum ption  and serve the interests of 
the colluding sellers by preven tin g ... new  entrants from  com p eting  
w ith  estab lished  sellers (E ath erly  1974 , p. 213).
The objective of this paper is not to argue for or against the 
existing policy of prohibition as a means of controlling the social 
costs of the consumption of heroin. Rather, it argues that where a 
significant dem and for some com m odity exists, prohibition, 
w hilst restricting consumption, results in a m ore entrenched  
in d u stry  with large profits for those involved. It seem s 
paradoxical that a policy designed to reduce, if not eliminate, the 
consum ption of heroin m ay in fact guarantee the long-term  
survival of the industry.
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